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Feedback in Voluntary Contribution Mechanisms: 
An Experiment in Team Production· 
Abstract 
Alchian and Demsetz's (1972) classic paper models team production as a public good. 
They claim detection of individual effort levels, rather than aggregate effort levels, 
reduces shirking (free riding). This paper experimentally tests this claim. Participants are 
informed either about the individual contributions of others on their team or only about 
their team's total contribution. Average contributions in the two treatments are the same. 
However, contributions under individual feedback have a significantly higher variance 
than those under total feedback. Implications of these results for team production are 
discussed. 
I 
Feedback in Voluntary Contribution Mechanisms: 
An Experiment in Team Production 
1. Introduction 
Alchian and Demsetz (1972) classic paper suggests modeling team production as 
a public goods problem. Each team member's effort bas a positive externality on the 
other team members. They claim that any costs of monitoring the effort expanded by an 
individual on a team will lead to shirking (free riding). 
If a worker's "relaxation cannot be detected perfectly at zero cost, part of its effects will 
be borne by others in the team, thus making his realized cost of relaxation less than the 
true total cost to the team. The difficulty of detecting such actions permits the private 
costs of his actions to be less than their full costs . .. [which] implies a lower rate of 
productive effort and more shirking than in a costless monitoring, or measuring, world." 
(p. 780) 
This vision of team production has been extensively developed and explored in the 
theoretical literature (Marshak and Radner ( 1972), Holmstrom ( 1982), Holmstrom and 
Tirole (1989)). 
This paper provides an experimental test of Alchian and Demsetz's original 
claims. A public goods problem is induced in the laboratory and the extent of shirking 
(free riding) is measured in both of two treatments. In the first, total-feedback treatment, 
participants have information only on the total amount contributed to the public good by 
the other members of their group. This is analogous to knowing the output or total effort 
of one's team (and one's own effort level) but not knowing how much effort each of the 
other players have contributed. Shirking thus cannot be detected, much less perfectly and 
at zero cost. In the second, individual-feedback treatment, participants are told at the end 
of each round how much each individual in their group contributed. This is analogous to 
knowing exactly how much effort each individual has contributed to the group product. 
Thus shirking can be detected perfectly and at zero cost. ' 
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The use of the voluntary contribution mechanism to elicit contributions to the 
public goods directly mirrors the voluntary nature of expended effort in an employment 
situation. Alchian and Demsetz write that "[The firm] . . . has no power of fiat, no 
authority , no disciplinary action any different in the slightest degree from ordinary 
market contracting between any two people." (p. 777) Workers voluntary choose the 
level of effort to expend, as in this mechanism participants voluntarily choose the level of 
contributions to make to the group account. 
The experiment further captures the team production analogy in that the game is 
repeated, but only finitely many times. Like an employment situation, individuals 
interact repeatedly and also like an employment situation, the game comes to an end 
eventually. 
The main result from this study is not consistent with Alchian and Demsetz's 
claim. Average contributions are not statistically different between the two feedback 
treatments. The variance of contributions in the individual-feedback treatment, however, 
is significantly higher than that in the total-feedback treatment. Implications of this result 
for team production are discussed in Section 5.2 
This research is of some methodological interest as well. Experimental 
economists have studied the public goods problem and the voluntary provision of public 
goods extensively (for excellent summaries see Davis and Holt (1993), ch. 6 and Ledyard 
(1995)). Although most previous public goods experiments have been run under the 
total-feedback condition, some (e.g., Chan, Godby, Mestelman and Muller (1993)) have 
been run under individual feedback. Understanding the difference between these two 
treatments can help us predict outcomes in these experiments and in their real-life 
counterparts more accurately. 
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2. Previous Research 
Two previous papers have examined the impact of distributional information on 
contributions in public goods games. Sell and Wilson (1991) compared three 
experimental conditions: individual information, aggregate information and no 
information. In the no information condition, participants were told nothing about the 
previous round 's results until the entire (ten-round) game had ended. In the aggregate 
information treatment, participants were told the total group's investment at the end of 
each period. This corresponds to the total-feedback treatment in this study. In the 
individual information condition. participants were told the total number of tokens each 
individual member had contributed to the public good. This treatment is similar to the 
individual-feedback treatment in this study, with one exception. In Sell and Wilson, 
members of a participant's group were identified and their contributions recorded over 
time. Each participant could thus "trace" each other participant's contributions from 
period to period. In this study, the contributions were not associated with any particular 
contributor. A participant could thus not directly observe another participant's lowering 
or raising his contribution.3 
Sell and Wilson find no statistical difference between contributions in the 
individual information and aggregate information conditions over all ten periods. These 
results are consistent with those presented here. In particular, average contributions 
between the individual- and total-feedback treatments do not differ significantly over the 
course of the game.4 
The variance of contributions observed in this study, however, does differ 
between the two treatments. Measures of the spread of individual contributions are not 
reponed in Sell and Wilson. Here, contributions in the individual-feedback condition 
have a significantly higher variance than those in the total-feedback condition. 
Weimann (I 994) also provides participants with information about individual 
contributions (as well as about individual earnings) and compares their decisions with 
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those of participants provided with information only about total contributions. He also 
concludes that average contributions do not change with the additional information. No 
information about the spread of individual contributions is reported. 
3. Experimental Procedure and Design 
This study used a voluntary contribution mechanism to elicit public goods 
provision. For each treatment, 24 participants (in two groups of 12) were recruited from 
economics classes in the University of Arizona summer session. Participants were 
randomly assigned to groups of four, remaining in the same group for the entire 
experiment. In each round they were endowed with 25 tokens, which could be placed 
either into a private account or into a group account but could not be saved for use in 
future rounds. Tokens are thus analogous to time which can be spent on leisure or on 
expanding effort. In a similar way hours cannot be saved for use the next day. Subjects 
were compensated in dollars for tokens (time) spent in a private account (on leisure) and 
in a public account (on effort). The experiments lasted a finite number of rounds. 
The conditions under which this procedure will induce a public goods problem are 
simple to illustrate. Assume each player i in a group of N identical players has some 
endowment E, which can either be c.ontributed to a group account and used to produce 
units of a public good (analogous to expending effort) or can be privately consumed and 
converted to cash (analogous to shirking or consuming leisure). Call the amount 
contributed to the group account by i , x,. The individual 's earnings from private 
consumption (leisure) is simply the amount consumed (E,- x,). The individual's earnings 
from contributions to the group account is a function of the sum of contributions by all 
participants P(L;x,). The group's earnings is the sum of the individual earnings and the 
payouts from the group account L;(E,- x,) + NP(!:,x,). Each individual chooses x, to 
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maximize his earnings ((E,- X;) + P~)). We say there is a (pure) public goods problem 
when two conditions are satisfied. 
Condition 1: Contributions to the private account are individually optimal. 
(1) 
Thus regardless of the contributions of the other players, player i never wants to 
contribute to the group account This is analogous to assuming that an individual prefers 
to shirk than to work in the absence of any punishment Were this not the case there 
would be no need for any sort of monitoring-all individuals would work because they 
preferred to do so. 
Condition 2: Contributions to the private account are not optimal for the group. 
NP'~) > 1 'v'x., 'v'x., 
1 P'~X;) > N 'v'x., 'v'x., (2) 
Regardless of the contributions of the other players the group as a whole earns more when 
player i contributes to the group account than when he contributes to the private account 
This is analogous to assuming that the team as a whole produces more than an individual's 
value ofleisure when an individual expands effort. Were this not the case it would be 
socially optimal for all workers to engage in leisure rather than in expanding effort 
The payoff per token for the private account in this study was 2¢ to the private and 
for the group account was 1¢ to each member of the group. With a group size of 4 we can 
confmn that both conditions (1) and (2) above are satisfied. Condition (1) suggests that 
each individual prefers to contribute each marginal token to the private account (earning 
2¢) than to the group account (earning I¢). Condition (2) suggests that the group as a 
whole is better off when each individual contributes his marginal token to the group 
account (which earns 4¢ for the group--!¢ for each of four members) than when he 
contributes his marginal token to the private account (which earns 2¢ only for him). 
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There were two games lasting ten rounds each. Participants were initially told 
they would play a game of ten rounds. At the end of the ten rounds, they were told 
(unexpectedly) that there was just enough time to restan the game and to play another ten 
rounds. This technique has been used previously to simulate a "new game" (Andreoni 
(1988)) or in this setting, a new task with the same team members. The first ten rounds 
(the first game) and the second ten rounds (the restart game) are reported separately. 
This study was completely computerized. Participants signed in, collected their 
show-up fee and sat at a computer terminal. The instructions were given via the 
computer screen and participants typed their contribution decisions on the keyboard. 
Participants played three practice rounds (for which they earned no money) to familiarize 
themselves with the setup of the computer. 6 Participants were paid a five dollar show-up 
fee plus their earnings in the experiment Each session lasted around an hour and 
participants earned on average $13.97 along with the show-up fee. 
At the end of each round in the total-feedback treatment, participants saw their 
own earnings, the total number of tokens the other three members of their group had 
contributed to the public good and the group's total contribution. In the individual-
feedback treatment, participants saw the individual contributions of the other three 
members of their group in increasing order of contribution, as well as their own earnings 
and the total contributed. In contrast to Sell and Wilson, here individual contributions 
were not identified with their contributor. Weimann does not describe the level of 
identification available in his setting. 7 
When a game such as this one, which includes a pure public goods problem, is 
played once there is a unique dominant strategy equilibrium in which all players fully 
free ride (fully shirk). When the game is repeated finitely many times (with endowments 
expiring at the end of each period), contributing zero in all periods is the unique subgame 
perfect equilibrium. These strong equilibrium predictions are, however, not typically 
observed. 
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4. Experimental Results 
A. Feedback Treatment 
Of primary interest is the difference in contributions between the two feedback 
(monitoring) conditions. Overall, average contributions in the two treatments were 
statistically indistinguishable. 8 Over all periods in the first game there are no significant 
differences between treatments in average contributions. Over all periods in the restart game, 
contributions are significantly different between treatments at the 5% level. If we pool 
average contribution levels over both games, there is no statistical difference in contributing 
behavior between the two treatments. These results are described in Table 1 below.9 
Insert Table 1 here 
Figure 1 shows the average participant contribution in each treatment over ten 
first rounds and ten restart rounds. The average contributions in each treatment are very 
close, except at the end of the second ten rounds where they diverge. 
Insert Figure 1 here 
Although there is no statistical difference in average contributions between the 
two treatments overall, the variances of these contributions differ greatly. There is 
significantly more variation in group contributions under the individual-feedback 
condition. 10 That the variances of contributions differ between treatments can be tested 
with an F-test. Table 2 reportS variances of average group contributions in each period. 
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Insert Table 2 here 
An F-test on contributions between treatments within each game and over both games 
combined, reports significantly more variation under individual feedback than under total 
feedback. The results of these F-tests are depicted in Table 3.11 
Insert Table 3 here 
These high variances under the individual-feedback condition seem to come from 
each group developing its own norm of contribution (or effort) level. Implications of a 
group effort-norm on team production will be discussed in section 5. 
The variance of contributions within each group is not significantly greater under 
individual feedback than under total feedback . The variance of contributions between 
groups, however, is significantly greater under individual feedback than under total. A 
comparison in Figures 2 and 3 of the spread of average group contributions shows this 
variance. 
Insert Figures 2 and 3 here 
Finally, we can look at the proportion of free riders (participants contributing zero 
tokens or shirking) and of full contributors (participants contributing all 25 tokens) in 
each treatment. Table 4 compares the incidence of free riding in the two treatments and 
Table 5 examines the incidence of full contribution. If the proportions of players free 
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riding and fully contributing are pooled over both games, these proportions are 
significantly different at the I% level between treatments (t= ll.27 for free riders, t=-5.05 
for full contributors). 1z 
Insert Tables 4 and 5 here 
There is always at least as much free riding and full contributing in the individual-
feedback treatment as in the total-feedback treatment. This result is consistent with the 
higher variance of contributions in the individual-feedback condition seen in Table 3. 
B. Learning 
Of secondary interest is the amount of learning exhibited by participants in this 
experiment between the first and the restart games. If learning were found it may suggest 
that workers learn to shirk less (or more) as they engage in more team production. 
However. behavior in the restart game was similar to that of the first under both 
conditions. In fact, the distribution of contributions in a given round was 
indistinguishable from the distribution of contributions in that same-numbered restarted 
round, with one exception.13 
A more powerful statistical test uses a blocking technique to distinguish between 
contributions in the first game (the first 10 rounds) and contributions in the restart game 
(the second 10 rounds). Here, the total-feedback treatment shows some evidence of 
decreasing contribution levels over the two games (more shirking), but there is no such 
evidence for the individual-feedback treatment. 14 
5. Conclusion 
This srudy experimentally tests and rejects Alchian and Demsetz's original 
hypothesis that if individual contributions to team production were known, shirking 
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would decrease. Individual contributions to a public good in the lab are the same under 
both feedback conditions; total feedback about the group's aggregate effort levels and 
individual feedback detailing how much each member of the group contributed. This 
result replicates those found under similar informational conditions reported in Sell and 
Wilson and in Weimann. 
However, the variance of the contributions between the two treatments differs 
significantly. A much higher proportion of participants fully shirk (free ride) under 
individual feedback than under total feedback. More participants fully contribute under 
the individual-feedback condition as well. The higher variance in contributions is driven 
not by more variance within each group, but by more variance berween groups. The 
average group contributions under individual fe.edback are more varied than they are 
under total feedback. 
This difference in variance has some important implications for incentive and 
compensation schemes in team production. More available and detailed information on 
who is contributing what to the output of the team will not necessarily raise the average 
contribution or effort expanded. It will, however, raise the variance of output between 
teams. In a production process where one team's outputs are other team's inputs this 
increased variance could be extremely costly. In processes where teams operate 
relatively independently, the increased variance may be irrelevant. 
This high variance suggests there may be some (hidden) characteristics of teams 
which lead them either to shirking or cooperating. Without knowing in advance which 
team has which characteristics, a planner cannot know how an individual team will react 
to the additional information. More research is clearly needed to understand the 
development of these group norms which will enable us to estimate a team's reaction to a 
change in information. 
These results have implications for experimental methodology as well. 
Researchers often compare outcomes between experiments to draw general conclusions. 
I I 
This study suggests that results from public goods experiments run under different 
feedback conditions might look the same in terms of average contributions. Despite this 
observational equivalence, the distributions generating those averages may be 
significantly different. Statistical tests comparing contributions between experiments 
should be carefully selected to be consistent with this difference. 15 
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the University of Arizona is gratefully acknowledged 
'These two types of feedback mechanisms are used in fundraising efforts as well. A 
counterpart to the total-feedback treatment is the giant thermometer often seen in 
fundraising drives. The readings at the thermometer's top indicate the drive's 
fundraising goal and thermometer is filled to the level of money already raised. This 
provides information about the rora/ others have contributed to the effort, but no 
information about the size and distribution of individual contributions. A counterpart to 
the individual-feedback treatment can be seen on the backs of theater playbooks. 
Contributions are typically divided into categories by amount (Patron, Friend, 
Benefactor, etc.). A potential contributor can see how many others have contributed 
(approximately) how much to the effort. 
2The experiment reported in this paper uses a fixed compensation scheme and changes 
the level of information available to the participants. For an excellent evaluation of 
various incentive and compensation schemes with the same levels of information see 
Nalbantian and Schotter (1994). 
3In Sell and Wilson's design, two factors were confounded in the comparison between 
individual and aggregate information; (I) knowing individual feedback versus total 
feedback and (2) knowing how an individual's contribution changed over time (by 
tracing his contributions period-to-period) versus knowing only how the total group 
contribution (minus your own) changed over time. Under this paper's procedure, 
participants cannot trace an individual's contribution over time in either of the conditions, 
making the comparison between treatments a measure of only the feedback and not of the 
additional information. The similarity of the results between the two studies suggests that 
this particular distinction was irrelevant. 
4By aggregating the contributions only over the last five periods of the game (a somewhat 
arbitrary choice), Sell and Wilson demonstrate that participants in the individual infonnarion 
condition comribute more than participants in the aggregate infonnation condition. 
5P'(S;x,)) is often called the marginal per capita return (MPCR) and is the marginal return 
on contributions to the group account. 
6Data from practice rounds and copies of instructions are available from the author. 
7Since the individual contributions were displayed in increasing order rather than in the 
order of participant number, participants could not identify how much (or whether) a 
group member's contribution had changed in consecutive rounds. 
~n only one of the twenty periods of the game (period nine of the restart game), average 
contributions differ. Contributions in the other periods are not significantly different. 
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~he Wilcoxon statistic tests the hypothesis that two sets of data were generated from the 
same underlying distribution. For each period, independent observations (average group 
contributions n==6 m=6) were compared. For each game, average group contributions for 
all ten periods were tested using the large sample approximation version of the test (n=60 
m=60). Over both games togerher (n=l20 m=J20) the Wilcoxon test with large sample 
approximation could not reject the hypothesis that the data were generated from the same 
underlying distribution at the 5% level (z=J.S7 p=.I IS7). 
10Group contributions in each round are independent observations as members of one 
group never interacted with members of another. Some groups achieved rhe pareto 
optimal solution of full contribution in the individual-feedback condition in all but rhe 
last few rounds of each game. 
11The F-test results reported here pooled the average group contributions for each period 
over each game and over both games. In each game n=60 m=60 (6 groups for 10 
periods). In borh games n==l20 m==l20. 
12The t-test used here testS the similarity of two proportions. If Pi is rhe proportion of 
free riders (alternately, full contributors) in treatment i and ni is the number of 
observations in the treatment then 
p, - p t=-r~--~~~~~~ p,(l- p,)/ + p, (1- p, )/ 
;In, Jfn: 
Here, ni for each individual period is 24 individual contributions. Over each game, 240 
observations were used (24 contributions in each of 10 periods). Over borh games, 480 
observations were used. 
13Using a 2-sided Wilcoxon test on individual contributions, we cannot reject at 5% level 
the hypoThesis that contributions in round i of the first game are the same as contributions 
in round i of the restart game with one exception: total feedback first round 7 and restart 
round 7 are different at rhe 5% level. 
1
"The blocking technique looks at the differences between each participant's contribution 
in period i of the first game and period i of the restart game fori= I, 2, ... ! 0. Then it tests 
wherher rhe distribution of rhese differences is significantly different from zero. In the 
total-feedback treatment, rhe distribution of these differences was significantly positive 
(z=S.ll, p<.Ol), suggesting that participants contributed Jess in the restart game than they 
had in the first game. In the individual-feedback treatment, however, this distribution is 
not distinguishable from zero at any level of significance (z=.30, p>.2). 
15Weimann (1 994) is an excellent case-in-point. The author compares two experimental 
treatments wirh differing feedback on the basis of their means, concludes that there is no 
statistical difference between the treatments and proceeds to pool the data without 
examining rhe variances of the observations. 
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Table 1 
Average Investment in Public Good per Subject 
Rnund Both 
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 All Games 
Total 13.96 12.83 11.42 12.33 12.33 11.88 9.92 7.79 9.04 4.54 10.60 
Individual 16.50 13.7 1 12.67 12.33 11.63 11.67 8.38 8.38 8.42 6.42 11.01 
Differettce -2.54 -0.88 -1.25 0.00 0.71 0.21 1.54 -0.58 0.63 -1.88 -0.40 8.95 Total 
I 0.88 Individual 
Restart Total 11.54 11.33 10.29 7.88 7.33 6.88 4.21 6.50 4.25 2.67 7.29 - 1.94 Difference 
Restart Individual 13. 13 11.7 1 10.58 9.88 9.42 12.00 11.33 9.54 12. 13 7.83 10.75 
Difference -1.58 -0.38 -0.29 -2.00 -2.08 -5.13 -7.13 -3.04 -7.88. -5.17 -3.47 * 
*different at the 5% level (two-sided Wilcoxon test) 
Table 2 
Variance of Average Group Contributions 
Round 
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Total 51.06 66.47 35.57 13.54 16.62 43.79 14.14 44.09 32.34 13.36 
Individual 28.25 38.94 73.04 58.59 74.39 62.44 74.72 78.87 33.69 26. 17 
Difference 22.8 1 27.53 -37.48 -45.05 -57 78 -18.65 -60.58 -34.78 -136 - 12.81 
Rcstan Total 32.34 13.36 38.24 37.82 43.94 43.14 2 1.42 25.77 10.64 13.33 
Restart Individual 26.17 65.32 80.36 66.39 67.99 6322 76.03 73.14 94.64 43.59 
Difference 6.17 -51.96 -42.13 -28.58 -24.06 -20.07 -54.61 -47.37 -84.00 -30.27 
Table 3 
F-Tes t Results on Average G•·ou1> ContrihuCions 
Total versus Individual Feedback 
Original Game Re.~tart Game 
F(59,59) = 1.56 F(59,59) = 1.97 
p = 0.046 p = 0.005 
Both Games 
F( I 19 ,I 19) = 1.61 
p = 0.005 
Table 4 
P.-oporlion of Free Riders 
Round 
I 2 
Total 0.08 0.08 
Individual 0.08 0.2 1 
Difference 0.00 -0.13 
Restart Total 0.04 0.04 
Restart Individual 0.29 0.33 
Di ffcrcnce -0.25 * -0.29 ** 
*different at the 5% level (two-sided t-test) 
**different at the I% level (two-sided t-test) 
3 4 5 
0.04 0.04 0.08 
0.25 0.21 0.21 
-0.21 * -0.17 -0.13 
0.04 0.13 0.04 
0.42 0.38 0.42 
-0.38 ** -0.25 • -0.38 ** 
6 7 8 9 10 All 
0.04 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.13 0.06 
0.38 0.46 0.29 0.42 0.63 0.31 
-0.33 ** -0.46 ** -0.25 * -0.38 ** -0.50 ** -0.25 ** 
0.04 0.04 0. 17 0.13 0.13 0.08 
0.33 0.33 0.46 0.33 0.50 0.38 
-0.29 ** -0.29 ** -0.29 * -0.21 -0.38 ** -0.30 ** 
Table 5 
Proportion of Full Contributors 
Round 
I 2 
Total 0.33 0.29 
Ind ividual 046 0.29 
Difference -0.13 0.00 
Restart Total 0.2 1 0.2 1 
Restart Individual 0.38 0.29 
Difference -0. 17 -0.08 
*different at the 5% level (two-sided t-test) 
**different at the I% level (two-sided t-test) 
3 4 5 
0.25 0.29 0.25 
0.38 0.29 0.29 
-0.13 0.00 -0.04 
0.13 0.08 0.08 
0.25 0.29 0.25 
-0.13 -0.2 1 -0. 17 
6 7 8 9 10 All 
0.21 0.08 0.17 0.21 0.04 0.2 1 
0.33 0.21 0.17 0.2 1 0.13 0.28 
-0.13 -0. 13 0.00 0.00 -0.08 -0.06 
0.04 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.10 
0.33 0.29 0.29 0.38 0.25 0.30 
-0.29 ** -0.25 * -0.21 -0.33 ** -0.2 1 * -0.20 ** 
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Figure 1 
Average Contributions 
under Varying Feedback Conditions 
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Maximum, Minimum and Average Group Contributions 
under Total Feedback 
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Figure 3 
Maximum, Minimum and Average Group Contributions 
under Individual Feedback 
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Attached please find a set of screen print-outs which illustrate the 
instructions presented to the subjects for each of the treatments of 
this experiment. These instructions are to be used to aid in the 
reviewing process and are not intended for publication. 
• 
This is station u 1 
Welcome to an 
Economic Experiment 
This is an exper il•ent in the eronoooics of group decision 
naking. Various research agencies haue prouided the funds for 
conducting this research. If you follow the instructions and ll4ke 
good decisions you nay earn a considerable a.ount of ADney which 
will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiaent. Feel 
free to make as much money as you can. 
We will require some personal data for record keeping. All 
information is kept confidential. 
11...----~-----11, Press PgDn to continue .n--=====----
Design 
Progranming 
Uniuersitat 
: Arlington Llilliams, Antoni Bosch, Isabel Sanchez 
: Shawn LaMaster. Jordi nas. Zaca Sanchez 
Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona a Uniuersidad Carlos III, Madrid 
Copyright<Cl 1991 Conputer Research a Consulting 
Please enter the following information. 
Your Hame : croson 
Your Social Security Humber : 111-11-1111 
Your Telephone Humber : 999-9999 
Tucson, Arizona 
16.- --==----11 Press PgDn to continue .11----==== --.u 
Design 
Progrann i ng 
Uniuersitat 
: Arlington Williams, Antoni Bo.sch, Isabel sanchez 
: Shaun Lallaster. Jord i Mas. Zaca sanchez 
Ponpeu fabra, Barcelona a Uniuersidad Carlos III. Madrid 
Copyrlght (C) 1991 Computer Research a Consulting Tucson, Arizona 
Period : 2 Decision St4ge <Practice Period) 
C.:>:_t 
This is an experiment in the economics of gr oup decision maki11g. The 
experilllent ~ill last 2 periods . You have been randomly assigned to a 
particular group of 1 people (6 other people plus yourself). The ~hers 
of your group ~ill not change throughout the experiment. 
In the beginning of each period you and every other member of the group 
uill be endo~ed with 25 "tokens". In each period you must decide }lQI;I to 
diuide your tokens betueen a PRIUATE ACCOUNT and a GROUP ACCOUNT. Each 
person in the group has a PRIUATE ACCOUNT and is making a siRilar 
.decision. Howeuer, there is only one GROUP ACCOUNT for the entire group. 
In each period you will earn 2 cents for each token placed in your 
PRIUATE ACCOUNT. Thus, if you choose to place all of your tokens in your 
PRIVATE ACCOUNT you would earn <25 x 2) = 56 cents in that period. 
In each period you and euery other member of the group will earn 1 cent 
for each token placed in the GROUP ACCOUNT. All members of the group can 
place tokens in the GROUP ACCOUNT. 
Before making your decision you will have an opportunity to review the 
past decisions of your group by pressing FS. 
Your cash earnings for the experiment "'i ll be the sum of your profits 
from the GROUP ACCOUNT and fro"' your PRIUATE ACCOUNT. There will be 2 
practice periods before you begin the actual experir:1ent. The practice 
periods uill familiarize you with the computer progran. You will not be 
paid for the practice periods. 
= = = ===== ---=91 Press PgDn to continue Ill= ==========='~ 
Press the R key to see the instructions again. 
Press the Q key to su01100n an assistant if you 
haue questions. Otherwise, please be patient 
until the other players are ready. 
Waiting for others to finish . . . 
£ueryone is nou ready to begin. Before starting the 
experiMent there will be 2 practice periods. The practice 
periods will help you beco01e fa01iliar ~lth the co01puter 
progra01. You will not be paid for the practice periods. After 
the practice periods, the actual experinent will begin and 
uill last 2 periods. The noney earned during the actual 
experi01ent will be yours to keep. 
Good luck. 
~--------========9,1 Press PgDn to continue .~--==============~ 
Period: 1 Decision Stage (Practice Period) 
~ou have 25 tokens to divide between the PRIUAT£ and GROUP ACCOUNTS. 
For each token that you place in the PRIUATE ACCOUNT you will receive 
2 cents. 
For each token that each member of the group (including yourself) places 
in the GROUP ACCOUNT you and every other member of the group will receive 
1 cent. 
How rnany tokens do you want to place in the GROUP ACCOUNT? - >2 
You have decided to place 2 tokens in the GROUP ACCOUNT this period. 
You uill place the reoaining 23 tokens in your PRIUATE ACCOUNT this period. 
Press FlO to confirm, or press any other key to change your decision 
Results of Period: 1 (Practice Period) 
Total number of tokens in the GROUP ACCOUiiT 
Nunber of tokens others placed in the GROUP ACCOUNT 
Your earnings fran the PRIUATE ACCOUNT 
Your earnings from the GROUP ACCOUNT 
3 tokens 
9 tokens 
44.9 cents 
3.9 cents 
u...------= = =l,l Press any key to continue .~t--= ===---...11 
, 
The practice periods haue ended. Press F5 to reuiew the history of 
the practice periods. Press any other key to continue to the actual 
experiment. 
I Press FS to reuiew the history Press any other key to continue 
Period: 2 Decision Stage (Practice Period) 
You have 25 tokens to divide between the PRIVATE and GROUP ACCOUNTS. 
For each token that you place in the PRIUATE ACCOUNT you will receive 
2 cents. 
For each token that each ne~ber of the group (including yourself) places 
in the GROUP ACCOUNT you and every other ~e~ber of the group uill r eceive 
1 cent. 
To help with your decision, you ~ay want to look at the history of past 
decisions of this group. To see the history of pas t decisions press FS. 
Ho~ ~any tokens do you want to place in the GROUP ACCOUNT? ->5 
You have decided to place 5 tokens in the GROUP ACCOUNT this period. 
You will place the renaining 26 tokens in your PRIUATE ACCOUNT this period. 
Press FlO to confir~. or press any other key to change your decision 
Nou ue uill begin the actual experi~ent . The 
experi~ent will las t 2 periods. The ~oney you earn fro~ 
now on will be yours to keep, so ~ake your decisions 
carefully. 
"=~~======l,l Press any key to continue 1,1==~-~==...a 
Period: 1 Decision Stage 
You haue 25 tokens to diuide between the PRIVATE and GROUP ACCOUNTS. 
For each token that you place in the PRIVATE ACCOUNT you will receiue 
2 cents. 
For each token that each ~e~ber of the group (including yourself) places 
in the GROUP ACCOUNT you and euery other member of the group will receiue 
1. cent. 
How ~any tokens do you want to place in the GROUP ACCOUNT? ->3 
You haue decided to place 3 tokens in the GROUP ACCOUNT this period. 
You uill place the re~aining 22 tokens in your PRIVATE ACCOUNT this period. 
Press f16 to confir~. or press any other key to change your decision 
History of results 
Your Others Earnings 
tokens tokens Total fro~ 
----------
-- --
GROUP PRIVATE GROUP GROUP GROUP PRIVATE TOTAL 
eriod ACCNT ACCNT ACCNT ACCNT ACCNT ACCNT EARNINGS 
======================================= ===================================== 
1 
2 
3 
8 
22 
17 
e 
e 
3 
8 
s e.e3 
s e.e8 
$ 6.44 
$ 9.34 
$ 9.47 
s e.42 
---~===ll Press any key to return to the experiment 1 ===- ---...u 
The exper i"'ent has ended. Press FS to reu iew the history of 
the experinent. Press any other key to end the prograA and to 
collect your noney. 
I Press FS to reuiew the history Press any other key to end 
I 
I 
Congratulations! ~ou haue reached the end of the exercise. 
You haue earned 9.81 dollars. 
Please remain in your seat quietly until your name is called. 
Thank you for your participation. 
History of results 
'lour Others Earnings 
tokens tokens Total fi'OII 
-------
GROUP PRIVATE GROUP GROUP GROUP PRIVATE TOTAL 
•eriod ACCHT ACCHT ACCHT ACCHT ACCHT ACCHT EAR111HGS 
============================================================================= 
1 
2 
1 
1 
24 995, 681, - 5882 1 
24 -39,7986, -293 1 
$ 9.91 
$ 9.91 
$ 9.48 
$ 9.48 
$ 9.49. 
$ 9.49 
Press any key to return to the experi~nt 1~----==---=-.--D 
This is an experiment in the economics of group decision making. The 
experiment will last 2 periods. You haue been randomly assigned to a 
particular group of 1 people (9 other people plus yourself). The ~bers 
of your group will not change throughout t he exper iment . 
In the beginning of each period you and euery other member of the group 
will be endowed with 25 "tokens". In each period you must decide ho111 to 
divide your tokens between a PRIVATE ACCOUNT and a GROUP ACCOUNT. Each 
person in the group has a PRIVATE ACCOUNT and is making a siMilar 
.decision. However, there is only one GROUP ACCOUNT for the entire group. 
In each period you will earn 2 cents for each t oken placed in your 
PRIUATE ACCOUNT. Thus, if you choose to place all of your tokens in your 
PRIUATE ACCOUNT you would earn czs x 2) = sa cents in that period. 
In each period you and euery other member of the group will earn 1 cent 
for each token placed in the GROUP ACCOUNT. All •embers of the group can 
place tokens in the GROUP ACCOUNT. 
Before making your decision you will haue an opportunity to reuie.~ the 
past decisions of your group by pressing rs. 
Your cash earnings for the experiMent will be the sun of your profits 
fro• the GROUP ACCOUNT and from your PRIUATE ACCOUNT. There will be 2 
practice periods before you begin the actual experiloent. The practice 
periods will familiarize you with the c001puter progrll.l!o. You will not be 
paid for the practice periods. 
= = ===== = = ==II Press PgDn to continue 11===========:!1 
Results or Period: 1 (Practice Period) 
Total number or tokens in the GROUP ACCOUHT 1 token 
Humber of tokens placed in the GROUP ACCOUHT by the 
other a Jllelllbers of the group (increasing order) 
9?32 
Your earnings fro111 the PRIVATE ACCOUHT 
Your earnings fro~~~ the GROUP ACCOUHT 
24263 , - 7215, 
48 .6 cents 
1.9 cents 
1!...------==-ll. Press any Jcey to continue .a--------~ 
--------- History of results (Practice Session)=======----~ 
Your 
t okens 
GROUP PRIVATE 
Period ACCrlt ACCHT 
Others 
tokens 
GROUP 
ACOtT 
Total 
GROUP 
AC01J 
Earnings 
fro.. 
GROUP 
ACOtt 
PRIVATE 
ACOtt 
TOTAL 
EARHIHGS 
== =========================================================================== 
1 
2 
1 
1 
I 
I 
21 212. 3-72.59?32 1 
21 -11,8- 15.22661? 1 
$ 6 .81 
$ 6 .91 
$ 8.48 
$ 8.48 
$ 8.19 
$ 9 .19 
'-===~---ll Press any key to return to t he experiment jll-===~--...a 
